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HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY:
WHENCE AND WHITHER?
James F. Blumsteint
IN THE BEGINNING, there was Law and Medicine. That was
a course often taught in law schools and in schools of public health. It
typically dealt with medical malpractice issues from a forensics perspective. Trial issues such as expert witnesses, evidence matters, etc.,
absorbed a lot of attention.
In the beginning, health law was not a field of study or of practice,
at least under that terminology. One of my contributions to the discipline was that, during the time that I chaired the Law and Medicine
section of the Association of American Law Schools, we succeeded in
renaming the section Law, Medicine, and Health Care, a more inclusive nomenclature that reflected the broader set of issues taught in law
school classes and practiced by the health law bar. Indeed, one of the
most significant changes over the years has been the evolution of a
discipline of health law, an area in which practitioners specialize and
in which students can find employment. The American Bar Association now has a section on health law in recognition of its niche in law
practice.
Yet, it is hard to make the case that health law, as a field of study
or practice, fits into a neat, coherent, analytically discrete box. Professor Gregg Bloche has asserted that "[t]he law governing American
health care arises from an unruly mix of state and federal agencies and
from a jumble of statutes and common-law doctrines conceived, in the
main, without medical care in mind."' What gives health law its special character is its topical involvement with medical care. Health law
encompasses how public policy should address matters related to individual and public health. And so, health lawyers must help clients
and courts develop a way of thinking about medical care issues-a
framework-to provide a context for the "doctrines conceived . . .

t University Professor of Constitutional Law and Health Law and Policy,
Vanderbilt University and Director, Health Policy Center, Vanderbilt Institute for
Public Policy Studies.
SM. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 24950 (2003) [hereinafter Bloche, The Invention of Health Law].
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without medical care in mind.",2 Those doctrines must be adapted and
fine-tuned to the particularized context of health care with special
reference to the institutions, culture and values peculiarly related to
that field. At the same time, the evolution of health law doctrine cannot be-and should not be-irrationally disconnected to those "doctrines conceived ...

without medical care in mind" when those doc-

trines and concepts have appropriate application to the health law and
policy arena.
It is always important to bear in mind that "how one thinks about
an issue and the way an issue is framed shape the way one analyzes
it."'3 In this regard, I would contend that the central issues with which
health law and health lawyers have had to struggle are how to think
about medical care issues, which principles from other areas of law
and public policy have application to health law, and to what extent
they should apply. Probably the most difficult problem that the field
of health law and policy has had to confront is the appropriate role of
economics in medical care decision-making. 4 A correlative has been
to address the issue of who should be introducing economic considerations into the decision-making process (if one assumes that some
role for economics is appropriate) 5 and under what circumstances. 6
2

Id.

3 James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the
President:An Overview andPolicy Analysis ofCurrent Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 880
(2001) [hereinafter Blumstein, Regulatory Review].
4 In this regard, Professor Clark C. Havighurst has been a pioneer. See,
e.g.,
Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in
Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L.REV. 6, 7, 9-20 (1975) (noting that
allocation of resources to health care is a central policy issue); see also James F.
Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assuring Quality,
Accountingfor Costs, and Coping With an Evolving Reality in the Health Care Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 125, 125-30, 141-44 (2002) (raising question
whether customary practice standard of liability appropriately takes cost factors into
account); James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare)as a Case Study and a Paradigm,53
VAND. L. REV. 125, 202-10 (2000) (noting significance of institutional design on
cost-containment issues and observing that managed care was an effort to introduce
economic considerations into medical care decision-making).
5 See generally Mark A. Hall, Rationing Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 693, 764-68 (1994) (arguing that physicians should make health care rationing
decisions because they are more trustworthy than insurers or government); M. Gregg
Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 924
(2002) [hereinafter Bloche, Trust and Betrayal] (explaining the historical rejection of
economic competition in health care as "beneath professional dignity"). See also
James F. Blumstein, RationingMedical Resources:A Constitutional,Legal, and
Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1392-95 (1981) [hereinafter Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources] (discussing how the standards for informed consent in
different jurisdictions might be affected by government rationing decisions).
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"In a nation whose institutions have relied on market mechanisms

for making basic economic choices, governmental imposition [of nonmarket mechanisms of resource allocation] bears a burden of persuasion." 7 Yet, the tradition in health care has started from the opposite
assumption-an "assumption that the laws of economics do not apply
to the health arena.",8 For years, those who thought that market-based
approaches have an appropriate and important role to play in institutional design had to overcome a presumptive skepticism toward that
belief. Over time, many health policy analysts became "much more
prone to shift the burden of proof to those who claim that the market
does not, cannot, or should not function properly in the health sector." 9

Advocates for market-oriented policies in health care recognized
that "[t]he choice between competition and regulation is a choice between imperfect systems," as it is "not realistic to expect that the
medical marketplace conform[] to all the textbook preconditions for a
perfectly competitive situation."' 0 At the same time, "it is unreasonable to assume that abstract aspirations for a regulatory system can in
practice be fully realized.""

That is, "[i]n the real world . .. the

choice is not between competition and regulation in either pure
form." '

2

Rather, "the realistic range of public choice does not reflect

3
a total commitment to one or another system of social ordering."',
The issue for public policy is "where to draw the line along a continuum of public-private responsibility,"' 4 with pro-market advocates
asserting "that those who seek to involve government should bear the
burden of establishing the existence of either an institutional misfunction or an equitable problem in need of redress."' 15
6 See, e.g., William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure
Laws andAmerican Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1713-43 (1999) (analyz-

ing the rationales for regulation of disclosure in health care, including the "competition rationale," which attempts to balance the market by giving patients and purchasers increased access to information).
7 James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health PlanningandRegulation
Through Certificate of Need: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3.
8 See James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role
in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the DoctorShould Order?, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 849, 852-53 (1981) [hereinafter Blumstein & Sloan] (noting that health policy analysts had just begun "to think of the health sector.., as an economic system,
subject to economic principles" at the time the article was written).
9 Id. at 853.
'0 Id. at 854.
11 Id.

12 Id.
13 Id.
14Id. at 855.
15ld. See also Blumstein, RationingMedical Resources, supra note 5, at
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The culture of medicine, traditionally, has been steeped in professional values.' 6 The professional model takes as its premise that, empirically, the economic marketplace does not and cannot function
properly in the healthcare field, and, normatively, that it should not so
function. 17 Thus, "[m]arket factors such as cost-benefit trade-offs are8
not only seen as irrelevant, but as corruptive of medical judgments."'
This challenges the general belief that, presumptively, institutions
should be structured according to the dictates of the market, by allocating resources based on price and consumer preferences and
choices.
"The professional paradigm places power paternalistically in physician hands," with physicians "perceiv[ing] themselves as controlling
decision-making."' 9 Medical decision-making is viewed as "technical20
and scientific," with "[q]uality-cost trade offs [being] attenuated.,
The result is that "economics and trade offs become marginalized in
the policy debate," since medical care is seen as an "exclusively technical-scientific enterprise. ,,21Tu,[u
Thus, "[u]nder the professional paradigm, economic considerations undermine and corrode what are and
should be technical scientific judgments. 22
The professional model reflects an approach to market failure that
substitutes professional decision-making for that of consumers, who
are sovereign in the economic marketplace. The market failure that
underlies the claim for professional control is the asymmetry of information between physicians and patients.23 Doctors are highly
1349 (observing that "[o]ne clear justification for some form of governmental involvement in the medical care marketplace stems from widespread acceptance of the
view that society has some responsibility to help needy and worthy persons secure
access to medical services").
16 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions
of Medical Care: Antitrust and State ProviderCooperationLegislation, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 1459, 1463 (1994) [hereinafter Blumstein, Competing Visions].
17 See Blumstein, Regulatory Review, supra note 3, at 881.
18 James F. Blumstein, Medicine Isn 't an Economics-FreeZone, WALL ST.
J., June 22, 2001, at A14.
19 Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 16, at 1465.
20 Id. at 1466.
21 id.
22 Blumstein, Regulatory Review, supra note 3, at 881.
23 E.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 946 (1963) (observing that "[w]hen there is uncertainty," knowledge tends to become "concentrated among those who can profit most
from it"). C.f James C. Robinson, The End of Asymmetric Information, 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 1045, 1051-52 (2001) (noting the potential impact of patients' increasing access to information, for example, via the internet); Frank A. Sloan, Arrow's Concept of the Health Care Consumer: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 899, 900, 909 (2001) (suggesting that health care consumers

2004]

HEALTH CARE LA WAND POLICY: WHENCE AND WHITHER?

39

trained scientists who make scientifically-based professional judgments based on medical criteria; patients are not well informed about
the technically complex dimensions of medical care and are not really
capable of becoming adequately informed so as to exercise control as
they would in a typical market-based context.
Professionals self-regulate as a means of restraining self-interest,
a necessary concomitant of placing decision-making authority in the
hands of the professional.2 4 And the professional paradigm assumes
that financial incentives do not and should not affect professional
judgment.2 ' That claim facilitated the growth of third-party medical
insurance; the normal economic considerations of moral hazard-that
a person will consume more when the cost is borne by someone
else-were, it was contended, inapplicable to the professional setting
of medical care. As one can see from the third-party insurance example, much institutional design in medical care was driven by the assumptions underlying the professional paradigm, namely, that economic considerations do not and should not influence medical decision-making.
A similar policy example is the on-going debate over the issue of
rationing in medical care.2 6 In economic terms, resources are "allocated" in any market-based system to their most efficient and highly
preferred use. Since human wants far exceed the availability of resources, there is always a need to allocate, to prioritize. The conventional professional paradigm contests the economics-based visionthe need to array economic resources "so as to maximize the medical
benefits that every dollar buys., 2 7 That is, the professional model
rejects the economic insight that medical resources (like all economic
resources) are scarce, and that "withholding of beneficial care" might
be appropriate in circumstances where the value of that care is excan be educated to overcome their lack of knowledge).
See Bloche, Trust and Betrayal,supra note 5, at 924 (discussing Kenneth
Arrow's argument that "[t]he ethic of self-sacrificing fidelity [of physician to patient]
reduced the risk of opportunistic exploitation of this knowledge asymmetry" and
"assuaged patients' fears of being exploited").
25 See id. (emphasizing the historic insistence on insulating professionals
from public or private influences on clinical judgment). See also Blumstein, supra
note 18, at A 14 (highlighting this assumption).
26 E.g., Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 16, at 1467-68 ("The
rhetoric of rationing and denigration of its use suggest that economic trade-offs are
inappropriate when it comes to health care."). For a thoughtful and comprehensive
consideration of rationing issues, see MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING
DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997).
For a discussion of rationing as a current policy matter, see Geeta Anand, The Big
Secret in Health Care: RationingIs Here, WALL ST. J.,Sept. 12, 2003, at Al.
27 Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, supra note 1, at 252.
24
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ceeded by its cost. The professional model reflects "physician conceptions of medical need that call for provision of care regardless of
cost when expected clinical benefits outweigh potential clinical
harms. 28
Use of the term "rationing" is a "rhetorical ploy" to advance the
anti-economic perspective of the professional paradigm by focusing
on a particular, centralized form of resource allocation. 29 But, as Professor Bloche candidly acknowledges in his recent defense of the professional paradigm and critique of economically-driven health care
policy, 30 the agenda is much broader: There is opposition not just to a
particular form of resource allocation, but resistance to consideration
of economic
trade-offs as "inappropriate when it comes to health
31
care."
The competing visions of medical care underlie the different critiques of various cases and doctrines that have evolved in health care.
Should economics influence medical decision-making at all or just not
unduly (however one might define the point at which medical judgment is "corrupted")? The North Carolina decision in Muse v. Charter Hospital of Winston-Salem, Inc.32 provides a good vehicle for discussing these issues and for framing much of the debate in health law
and policy.
Although the precise contours of the doctrine in Muse leave room
for debate, a broad reading of the case suggests that any hospital policy or practice designed to influence medical decision-making on account of economic considerations (e.g., the expiration of coverage
under an insurance policy) is improper as wanton and wilful conduct
subject to punitive damages.3 3 A nice contrast with the approach in
Muse is the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram v. Herdrich,34 holding that physician health-plan coverage decisions, which mix clinical
judgments with scope-of-benefits determinations, are not "fiduciary"
in nature under the federal ERISA law.35 The Court noted that when
physicians make mixed clinical-coverage determinations, they are not
acting solely in the interest of their individual patients and therefore
Id.
Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 16, at 1467.
30 Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, supra note 1, at 253-55 (rejecting
28

29

the policy of maximizing social welfare without acknowledging the complexity of
values involved in health law disputes).
3 Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 16, at 1467.
452 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 464 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1995).
3 Id. at 594 ("[A] hospital has the duty not to institute policies or practices
which interfere with the doctor's medical judgment.").
34 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
31 Id. at 237.
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cannot properly be deemed fiduciaries, since fiduciaries must act exclusively in the interest of their principals. 36 The Pegram Court considered it self-evident that physicians would take into account economic factors, 37 whereas the Muse Court deemed such considerations
antithetical to medical practice.
The evolution of policy and doctrine in health law will continue to
reflect the tension between the professional and the market-oriented
paradigms. It will also continue to reflect the rich normative overlay
of policy concern with individuals' access to medical care.38 These
pivotal underlying issues remain unresolved, and that continued debate leaves the development of policy and legal doctrine under contention since policy and legal doctrine implement the underlying principles. The result is likely to be the continued presence of doctrines
and policies in tension with one another; landmines that health lawyers and teachers must carefully identify and skillfully navigate.
These tensions mirror the underlying disagreements on core issues
related to normative premises (e.g., related to access issues) and to the
appropriate role of economics in medical decision-making.

36 Id. at 234-35.
37 Compare Pegram, 520

U.S. at 234-35 ("It would be so easy to allege, and
to find, an economic influence when sparing care did not lead to a well patient, that
any such standard in practice would allow a factfinder to convert an HMO into a
guarantor of recovery.") with Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 374-80 ( 7 th Cir.
1998) (decrying the evils of allowing economic considerations to play a role in medical decision-making).
38 For a discussion of these issues, see James F. Blumstein, Health
Care
Reform: The Policy Context, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 15, 29-38 (1994).

